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Re: [Coq-Club] VST release 1.6


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  • From: Chan Ngo <chan.ngo2203 AT gmail.com>
  • To: coq-club AT inria.fr
  • Subject: Re: [Coq-Club] VST release 1.6
  • Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 13:47:52 +0100
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Dear Andrew,

Thank you so much. Somehow I would like to look at this tool. As I understand, the correctness of the tool’s development is guaranteed by CompCert (a formal certified compiler). I have a quick question:
How do we compare this tool with other deductive verification tools for C programs (i.e., Why3, Frama-C)?

Thanks and happy new year,
Chan


On Dec 31, 2015, at 7:29 PM, Andrew Appel <appel AT CS.Princeton.EDU> wrote:

I am pleased to announce the release of version 1.6
of the Verified Software Toolchain, compatible with CompCert 2.6.
It includes the Verifiable C program logic, a higher-order separation logic
for reasoning in Coq about the correctness of C programs.


This release of Verifiable C has substantial improvements in robustness,
efficiency, usability, and documentation.  (All recent versions are proved
sound in Coq w.r.t. the CompCert operational semantics; "robustness"
refers to the capabilities of VeriC's proof automation system in assisting
users in building C-program correctness proofs in Coq).  

Qinxiang Cao, Lennart Beringer, Josiah Dodds, Jean-Marie Madiot, Santiago Cuellar,
and Gordon Stewart contributed to the development of this version.

Recent proofs in Verifiable C include:
correctness of OpenSSL SHA-256,   http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/papers/verif-sha.pdf
correctness of mbedTLS DRBG; specification of mbedTLS AES-256.
(There are plenty of applications other than crypto primitives, but crypto is a
convenient source of small, well-specified programs whose correctness
is actually important to people. :-)

Andrew W. Appel
Princeton University





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